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ABSTRACT
As advances in Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) demonstrate un-
precedented levels of performance in many critical applications,
their vulnerability to attacks is still an open question. We consider
evasion attacks at testing time against Deep Learning in constrained
environments, in which dependencies between features need to be
satisfied. These situations may arise naturally in tabular data or may
be the result of feature engineering in specific application domains,
such as threat detection. We propose a general iterative gradient-
based framework called FENCE for crafting evasion attacks that
take into consideration the specifics of constrained domains. We
apply it against Feed-Forward Neural Networks in two threat detec-
tion applications: network traffic botnet classification and malicious
domain classification, to generate feasible adversarial examples.
We extensively evaluate the success rate and performance of our
attacks, compare their significant improvement over several base-
lines, and analyze several factors that impact the attack success
rate, including the optimization objective and the data imbalance.
We show that with minimal effort (e.g., generating 12 additional
network connections), an attacker can change the model’s predic-
tion to the target one. We found that models trained on datasets
with higher imbalance are more vulnerable to our FENCE attacks.
Finally, we show the potential of adversarial training in constrained
domains to increase the DNN resilience against these attacks.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep learning has reached super-human performance in machine
learning (ML) tasks for classification in image classification, speech
recognition, and natural language processing. Still, research in
adversarial ML showed that deep neural networks (DNNs) are not
robust in face of adversarial attacks. Most of these attacks have
been demonstrated in continuous domains, in which features can
be modified independently [3, 5, 8, 15, 23, 26, 32, 38].
ML is also widely deployed in other application domains, in-
cluding security, finance, and healthcare, in which the raw data
is not directly suitable for learning and engineered features are
defined by domain experts to train DNNs. Additionally, in certain
application domains such as network traffic classification, the raw
data itself might exhibit domain-specific constraints in the original
input space. Therefore, adversarial attacks designed for continu-
ous domains need to be adapted to the specifics of constrained
applications.
Initial efforts for testing-time adversarial attacks (called evasion
attacks) for constrained domains are underway. Examples include
PDF malware detection [35, 39] and malware classification [17,
36], applicable to binary features. Kulynych et al. [22] introduce a
graphical framework for evasion attacks in discrete domains, that
constructs a graph of all possible transformations of an input and
selects a set of minimum cost to generate adversarial examples.
The previous work, however, cannot yet handle evasion attacks in
applications that need to respect complex feature dependencies, as
well as domain-specific constraints.
In this paperwe introduce a novel and general framework FENCE
(Feasible Evasion Attacks on Neural Networks in Constrained
Environments). FENCE generates feasible adversarial examples
in constrained domains that rely either on feature engineering or
naturally have domain-specific dependencies in the input space. At
the core of FENCE is an iterative optimization method that deter-
mines the feature of maximum gradient of the attacker’s objective
at each iteration, identifies the family of features dependent on that
feature, and modifies consistently all those features, while preserv-
ing an upper bound on the maximum distance. At any time during
the iterative procedure, the input data point is modified within the
feasibility region, resulting in feasible adversarial examples.
We demonstrate that FENCE can successfully evade the DNNs in
both applications with minimum effort. For instance, by inserting
12 network connections an attacker can change the classification
prediction from Malicious to Benign in the first application. We
perform detailed evaluation to demonstrate that our attacks perform
better than several baselines and existing attacks, and to compare
two optimization objectives in our FENCE framework. We also
study the impact of data imbalance to the classifier robustness and
show that models trained on datasets with higher imbalance, as is
common in security applications, are more vulnerable.
We consider attack models with minimum knowledge about the
ML system and test several approaches for performing the attacks
through transferability from a substitute model to the original one.
Finally, we test the resilience of adversarial training as a defensive
mechanism for DNNs trained in constrained environments. To
summarize, our contributions are:
(1) We introduce a general evasion attack framework FENCE
for constrained application domains.
(2) We apply FENCE to two threat detection applications using
different datasets and feature representations: a malicious
network connection classifier, and a malicious domain de-
tector, to generate feasible adversarial examples in these
domains.
(3) We extensively evaluate FENCE for these applications and
quantify the amount of effort required to bypass the classi-
fiers. We also evaluate the transferability of the proposed
evasion attacks between different ML models and architec-
tures.
(4) We measure the resilience of adversarially-trained models
against our attacks.
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Figure 1: Neural network training for images (left) and for constrained domains with feature space dependencies (right).
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Deep Neural Networks for Classification
A feed-forward neural network (FFNN) for binary classification
is a function y = F (x) from input x ∈ Rd (of dimension d) to
output y ∈ {0, 1}. The parameter vector of the function is learned
during the training phase using back propagation over the network
layers. Each layer includes a matrix multiplication and non-linear
activation (e.g., ReLU). The last layer’s activation is sigmoid σ for
binary classification: y = F (x) = σ (Z (x)), where Z (x) are the logits,
i.e., the output of the penultimate layer. We denote by C(x) the
predicted class for x . For multi-class classification, the last layer
uses a softmax activation function.
2.2 Threat Model
Adversarial attacks against ML algorithms can be developed in the
training or testing phase. In this work, we consider testing-time
attacks, called evasion attacks. There exist several evasion attacks
against DNNs: projected gradient descent-based attacks and the
penalty-based attack of Carlini and Wagner.
Projected gradient attacks. This is a class of attacks based on
gradient descent for objective minimization, that project the adver-
sarial points to the feasible domain at each iteration. For instance,
Biggio et al. [5] use an objective that maximizes the confidence
of adversarial examples, within a ball of fixed radius in L1 norm.
Madry et al. [26] use the loss function directly as the optimization
objective and use the L2 and L∞ distances for projection.
C&W attack. Carlini and Wagner [8] solve the following optimiza-
tion problem to create adversarial example against CNNs used for
multi-class prediction:
δ = argmin | |δ | |2 + c · h(x + δ )
h(x + δ ) = max(0,max(Zk (x + δ ) : k , t) − Zt (x + δ )),
where Z () are the logits of the DNN.
This is called the penalty method, and the optimization objective
has two terms: the norm of the perturbation δ , and a function
h(x + δ ) that is minimized when the adversarial example x + δ is
classified as the target class t . The attack works for L0, L2, and L∞
norms.
The DNN model is trained correctly and the attacker’s goal is
to create adversarial examples at testing time. In security settings,
typically the attacker starts withMalicious points that he aims to
minimally modify into adversarial examples classified as Benign.
We consider initially for our optimization framework a white-
box attack model, in which the attacker has full knowledge of the
ML system. White-box attacks have been considered extensively
in previous work, e.g., [5, 8, 15, 26] to evaluate the robustness of
existing ML classification algorithms. We also consider a more
realistic attack model, in which the attacker has information about
the feature representation of the underlying classifier, but not exact
details on the ML algorithm and training data.
We will address application domains with various constraints
in feature space. These could manifest directly in the raw data
features, or could be an artifact of the feature engineering process.
The attacker has the ability to insert records in the raw data, for
instance by inserting network connections in the threat detection
applications. We will ensure that the data points modified or added
by the attacker are feasible in the constrained domain.
3 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we start by describing the classification setting in
constrained domains with dependencies in feature space and the
challenges of evasion attacks in this setting. Then we devote the
majority of the section to present our new attack framework FENCE
that takes into consideration the relationships between features
that occur naturally in the problem space or are the result of feature
engineering.
3.1 ML classification in constrained domains
Let the raw data input space be denoted as R. This is the original
space in which raw data is collected for an application. In healthcare,
R could be the space of all data available for a patient. In network
security, R could be the raw network traffic.
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Figure 2: Flow of the FENCE Evasion Attack Framework.
Let the raw data be R = {r1, . . . , rM } ∈ R. In standard computer
vision tasks such as image classification, the raw data (image pixels)
is used directly as input for neural networks. Thus, the training
examples xi are the same as the raw data: xi = ri , i ∈ [1,M]. In this
case the feature space F is the same as the input space R.
In contrast, in other domains, such as threat detection or health,
there exist dependencies and constraints in the feature space. These
could manifest naturally in the considered application (for instance,
results of two blood tests are correlated).We denote by Feasible_Set(R)
the set of all feasible points in the raw data space.
Constraints might also result from the feature engineering pro-
cess performed in many settings (see Figure 1). In this case, features
are obtained by application of an operator Opj on the raw data:
xi j = Opj (R). Examples of operators areMax,Min, Avg, and Total.
The set of all supported operators applied to the raw data is de-
noted by O. This process creates N training examples x1, . . . ,xN
in feature space F , each being d-dimensional, with d the size of the
feature space. The feature engineering process creates dependencies
in feature space.
A data point z = (z1, . . . , zd ) in feature space F is feasible if there
exists some raw data R such as for all i , there exists an operator
Opj ∈ O with zi = Opj (R). The set of all feasible points in feature
space for raw data R and operators O are called Feasible_Set(R,O).
This space includes the set of feasible points Feasible_Set(R) (ob-
tained for O = ∅). Examples of feasible and infeasible points in
feature space are illustrated in Table 1.
Feature Feasible Infeasible
F1 0.2 0.5
F2 0.13 0.13
F3 0.33 0.33
F4 0.34 0.4
Table 1: Feasible and infeasible points in feature space. The
sum of the four features is 1 in the feasibility region.
3.2 Challenges
Existing evasion attacks are mostly designed for continuous do-
mains, such as image classification, where adversarial examples
have pixel values in a fixed range (e.g., [0,1]) and can be modified
independently [3, 8, 26]. However, the vast majority of applications
use tabular data, resulting in feature dependencies and physical-
world constraints that need to be respected.
Several previous work address evasion attacks in domains with
tabular data. The evasion attack for malware detection by Grosse
et al. [16], which directly leverages JSMA [32], modifies binary
features corresponding to system calls. Kolosnjaji et al. [20] use the
attack of Biggio et al. [5] to append selected bytes at the end of the
malware file. Suciu et al. [36] also append bytes in selected regions of
malicious files. Kulynych et al. [22] introduce a graphical framework
in which an adversary constructs all feasible transformation of an
input, and then uses graph search to determine the path ofminimum
cost to generate an adversarial example.
Neither of these approaches are applicable to our general set-
ting. None of these attacks satisfy the required dependencies in
the resulting adversarial vector. We believe that crafting adver-
sarial examples that are feasible, and respect all the application
constraints and dependencies to be a significant challenge. Once
application constraints are specified, the resulting optimization
problem for creating adversarial examples includes a number of
non-linear constraints and cannot be solved directly using out-of-
the-box optimization methods.
3.3 The FENCE framework
To address these issues, we introduce the FENCE framework for
evasion attacks that preserves a range of feature dependencies in
constrained domains. FENCE guarantees by design that the pro-
duced adversarial examples are within the feasible region of the
application input space.
The starting point for the attack framework are gradient-based
optimization algorithms, including projected [5, 26] and penalty-
based [8]. Of course, we cannot apply these attacks directly since
they will not preserve the feature dependencies. To overcome this,
we use the values of the objective gradient at each iteration to select
features of maximum gradient values. We create feature-update
algorithms for each family of dependencies that use a combination
of gradient-based method and mathematical constraints to always
maintain a feasible point that satisfies the constraints. We also
use various projection operators to project the updated adversarial
examples to feasible regions of the feature space.
The input consists of: an input sample x with label y (typi-
callyMalicious in security applications); a target label t (typically
Benign); the model prediction function C; the optimization objec-
tive G; maximum allowed perturbation dmax ; the subset of fea-
tures FS that can be modified; the features that have dependencies
FD ⊂ FS ; the maximum number of iterations M and a learning
3
Algorithm 1 FENCE Framework for Evasion Attack with Con-
straints
Require: x ,y: the input sample and its label; t : target label;C : pre-
diction function; G: optimization objective; dmax : maximum
allowed perturbation; FS : subset of features that can be modi-
fied FD : features in FS that have dependencies;M : maximum
number of iterations; α : learning rate.
Ensure: x∗: adversarial example or ⊥ if not successful.
1: Initializem ← 0;x0 ← x
2: // Iterate until successful or stopping condition
3: while C(xm )! = t andm < M do
4: ∇ ← [∇Gxi (xm )]i // Gradient vector
5: ∇S ← ∇FS // Gradients of features in FS
6: imax ← argmax∇S // Feature of max gradient
7: // Check if feature has dependencies
8: if imax ∈ FD then
9: // Update dependent features
10: xm+1 ← UPDATE_FAMILY(m,xm ,∇, imax )
11: else
12: Gradient update and projection
13: xm+1imax ← xmimax − α∇imax
14: xm+1 ← Π2(xm+1)
15: FS ← FS \ {imax }
16: m ←m + 1
17: if C(xm ) = t then
18: x∗ ← PROJECT_TO_RAW(xm )
19: return x∗
20: return ⊥
21: function UPDATE_FAMILY(m,xm ,∇, imax )
22: // Extract all dependent features on imax
23: Fimax ← Family_Dep(imax )
24: // Family representative feature
25: j ← Family_Rep(Fimax )
26: δ ← ∇j // Gradient of representative feature
27: // Initialization function
28: s ← INIT_FAMILY(xm ,∇, j)
29: // Binary search for perturbation
30: while δ , 0 do
31: xmj ← xmj − αδ // Gradient update
32: xm ← UPDATE_DEP(s,xm ,∇, Fimax )
33: if d(xm ,x0) > dmax then
34: // Reduce perturbation
35: δ ← δ/2
36: else
37: return xm
rate α for gradient descent. The set of dependent features are split
into families of features. A family is defined as a subset of FD such
that features within the family need to be updated simultaneously,
whereas features outside the family can be updated independently.
The algorithm proceeds iteratively. The goal is to update the data
point in the direction of the gradient (to minimize the optimization
objective), while preserving the domain-specific and mathematical
dependencies between features. In each iteration, the gradients of
all modifiable features are computed, and the feature of maximum
gradient is selected. The update of the data point x in the direction
of the gradient is performed as follows:
1. If the feature of maximum gradient belongs to a family with
other dependent features, function UPDATE_FAMILY is called (line
10). Inside the function, the representative feature for the fam-
ily is computed (this needs to be defined for each application).
The representative feature is updated first, according to its gradi-
ent value, followed by updates to other dependent features using
function UPDATE_DEP (line 32). We need to define the function
UPDATE_DEP for each application, but we use a set of building
blocks that are reusable. Once all features in the family have been
updated, there is a possibility that the update data point exceeds
the allowed distance threshold from the original point. If that is
the case, the algorithm backtracks and performs a binary search
for the amount of perturbation added to the representative feature
(until it finds a value for which the modified data point is inside
the allowed region).
2. If the feature of maximum gradient does not belong to any
feature family, then it can be updated independently from other
features. The feature is updated using the standard gradient update
rule (line 13). This is followed by a projection Π2 within the feasible
L2 ball.
Finally, if the attacker is successful at identifying an adversarial
example in feature space, it is projected back to the raw input
space representation (using function PROJECT_TO_RAW). With
the FENCE framework, we guarantee that modifications in feature
space always result in feasible regions of the feature space, meaning
that they can be projected back to the raw input space. Of course,
if the raw data representation is used directly as features for the
ML classifier, the projection is not necessary.
FENCE currently supports two optimization objectives:
Objective for Projected attack. We set the objective G(x) = Z1(x),
where Z1 is the logit for the Malicious class, and Z0 = 1 − Z1 for
the Benign class:
δ = argminZ1(x + δ ),
s.t. | |δ | |2 ≤ dmax ,
x + δ ∈ Feasible_Set(R,O)
Objective for Penalty attack. The penalty objective for binary
classification is equivalent to:
δ = argmin | |δ | |2 + c ·max(0,Z1(x + δ )),
x + δ ∈ Feasible_Set(R,O)
Our general FENCE evasion framework can be used for different
classifiers, with multiple feature representations and constraints.
The components that need to be defined for each application are: (1)
the optimization objectiveG for computing adversarial examples; (2)
the families of dependent features and family representatives; (3) the
UPDATE_DEP function that performs feature updates per family;
(4) the projection operation PROJECT_TO_RAW that transforms
adversarial examples from feature space to the raw data input.
3.4 Dependencies in Feature Space
We describe the dependencies in feature space that FENCE supports.
For each of these, there is a correspondingUPDATE_DEP algorithm.
Domain-Specific Dependencies. The supported domain-specific
dependencies are illustrated in Table 2. These dependencies might
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occur naturally in the raw data space. The Range dependency en-
sures that feature values are in a particular range, while the Ratio
dependency ensures that the ratio of two features is in an interval.
The one-hot encoded feature dependency is a structural depen-
dency of the input vector representation. Algorithms 2 and 3 show
how to preserve the Ratio and Range dependencies, respectively.
Type of dependency Formula
Ranдe xi : xi ∈ [a,b]
Ratio xi ,x j : xi ∈ [a · x j ,b · x j ]
One-hot encoding (OHE) {xi }N1 : xi ∈ {0, 1},
∑N
i=1 xi = 1
Table 2: Domain-specific feature dependencies.
Mathematical Feature Dependencies.Mathematical dependen-
cies resulted from feature engineering supported by FENCE are
illustrated in Table 3. These include statistical dependencies, linear
and non-linear dependencies between multiple features, as well as
combinations of these. To provide some insight, Algorithm 4 and
Algorithm 5 illustrate how to preserve NonLin and Stat dependen-
cies.
Type of dependency Formula
Statistical (Stat ) xmin ≤ xavд ≤ xmax
Linear (Lin)
∑M
i (wi ∗ xi ) = Ct
Non-linear (NonLin) xi − x j/xk = 0
Combinations of Lin, xmin ≤ (x j/xk )avд ≤ xmax
Stat , and NonLin
∑M
i (wi ∗ xi/xk ) = Ct
Table 3: Mathematical feature dependencies.
Update Dependencies Functions Examples. In this section we
describe the algorithms for two types of relationships for feature
dependency updates.
Algorithm 2 illustrates the procedure for updating dependent
features to satisfy the Ratio relationship. If the dependency between
two features x and y is such that x ∈ [a · y,b · y], then feature x is
modified according to the gradient value, but the range is restricted
to the interval [a · y,b · y].
Algorithm 3 gives the update function for Range. It ensures that
input x is projected to interval [a,b]. It returns the projected value
of x , as well as the absolute value between x and its projection.
Algorithm 4 shows the NonLin update feature dependency pro-
cedure. Here, we need to ensure that the constraint xi − x j/xk = 0
for three features xi ,x j , and xk . Gradient update is performed first
for x j , after which the value of xi is modified to ensure the equality
constraint, while feature xk is kept constant.
Algorithm 5 gives the update method for satisfying the Stat
dependency. This is done for a family of features that includes
the minimum xmin , the average xavд , the maximum xmax , and
the total number xtot from some events from the raw data. After
the update of feature xtot (by increasing, for example, the number
of connections), we need to adjust the average value xavд and
the corresponding minimum and maximum values. The input to
Update_Stat also includes a value v that is the new value added to
the raw data, which could impact the minim or maximum values.
Algorithm 2 Ratio Update Dependency Function
1: function Update_Ratio(x ,∇, F )
2: Parse F as a,b,x ,y such that x ∈ [a · y,b · y].
3: if x − α · ∇x < a · y then
4: x ′ ← a · y
5: else
6: if x − α · ∇x > b · y then
7: x ′ ← b · y
8: x ′ ← x − α · ∇x
9: return x ′
Algorithm 3 Ranдe Update Dependency Function
1: function Update_Range(x ,a,b)
2: Parse F as a,b such that x ∈ [a,b].
3: x ′ ← x)
4: if x < a then
5: x ′ ← a
6: if x > b then
7: x ′ ← b
8: return x ′, |x ′ − x |
Algorithm 4 NonLin Update Function
1: function Update_NonLin(x ,∇, F )
2: Parse F , the family of dependencies as: xi ,x j ,xk
3: such that: xi − x j/xk = 0.
4: x ′j ← x j − α∇j
5: x ′i ← x ′j/xk
6: x j ← x ′j , xi ← x ′i
Algorithm 5 Stat Update Function
1: function Update_Stat(x ,v, F )
2: Parse F , the family of dependencies as xmin ,xmax ,
3: xavд ,xtot ,xnum .
4: xavд ← xtot /xnum
5: xmin ← Min(xmin ,v)
6: xmax ← Max(xmax ,v)
4 CONCRETE APPLICATIONS
In this section we describe the application of FENCE to two clas-
sification problems for threat detection: malicious network traffic
classification, and malicious domain classification.
4.1 Malicious Network Traffic Classification
Network traffic includes important information about communica-
tion patterns between source and destination IP addresses. Classifi-
cation methods have been applied to labeled network connections
to determine malicious infections, such as those generated by bot-
nets [4, 7, 18, 29]. Network data comes in a variety of formats, but
the most common include net flows, Zeek logs, and packet captures.
Dataset. We leverage a public dataset of botnet traffic that was
captured at the CTU University in the Czech Republic, called CTU-
13 dataset [14]. The dataset includes Zeek connection logs with
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Figure 3: Zeek logs (top), raw data representation (left), and feature families per port (right) for network traffic classifier.
communications between internal IP addresses (on the campus net-
work) and external ones. The dataset has the advantage of providing
ground truth, i.e., labels ofMalicious and Benign IP addresses. The
goal of the classifier is to distinguishMalicious and Benign IP ad-
dresses on the internal network.
The fields available in Zeek connection logs are given in Figure 3.
They include: the timestamp of the connection start; the source IP
address; the source port; the destination IP address; the destination
port; the number of packets sent and received; the number of bytes
sent and received; and the connection duration (the time difference
between when the last packet and first packets are sent).
In this application, we can use either the raw connection rep-
resentation or leverage domain knowledge to create aggregated
features. We describe existing feature relationships and apply our
FENCE framework against both representations.
Raw Data Representation. This consists of the following fields:
one-hot encoded port number, one-hot encoded connection type, du-
ration, original bytes, received bytes, original packets, and received
packets. The feature vector is illustrated in Figure 3 on the left. The
raw data representation includes no mathematical dependencies,
but has the following domain-specific constraints:
- The TCP and UDP packet sizes are capped at 1500 bytes. We cre-
ate range intervals for these values, resulting in a Ratio dependency
between the number of packets and their sizes.
- The connection duration is the interval between the last and
the first packet. If the connection is idle for some time interval (e.g.,
30 seconds), it is closed by default by Zeek. The attacker can thus
control the duration of the connection by sending packets at certain
time intervals to avoid closing the connection. We generate a range
of valid durations from the distribution of connection duration in
the training dataset. This creates again a Ratio dependency between
the number of packets and their duration.
- Each continuous feature has its related minimum andmaximum
values, which are obtained from the training data distribution, thus
forming Ranдe relationships.
- The port number and connection type have one-hot encoded
OHE dependencies.
Engineered Features.Another possibility is to use domain knowl-
edge to create features that improve the classification accuracy. A
standard method for creating network traffic features is aggrega-
tion by destination port to capture relevant traffic statistics per port
(e.g., [14], [28]). This is motivated by the fact that different network
services and protocols run on different ports, and we expect ports to
have different traffic patterns. We select a list of 17 ports for popular
applications, including: HTTP (80), SSH (22), and DNS (53). We also
add a category called OTHER for connections on other ports. We
aggregate the communication on a port based on a fixed time win-
dow (the length of which is a hyper-parameter set at one minute).
For each port, we compute traffic statistics using theMax,Min, and
Total operators for outgoing and incoming connections. See the ex-
ample in Figure 3 on the right, in which features extracted for each
port define a family of dependent features. We obtain a total of 756
aggregated traffic features on these 17 ports. Table 4 includes the fea-
ture description. The resulting feature vector includes both types of
dependencies. The domain-specific relationships are the same
as for the raw data representation except for the one-hot encoding
relationship. There are additional Stat mathematical dependen-
cies between features: the minimum and maximum number of
packets, bytes and duration per connection must be updated after
change in the total number of packets, bytes, or connections.
Attack algorithm on raw data representation. The attacker’s
goal is to have a connection log classified as Benign instead of
Malicious. We assume that the attacker communicates with an ex-
ternal IP under its control (for instance, the command-and-control
IP), and thus has full control on the malicious traffic in that connec-
tion. We assume that the attacker can only add traffic to network
connections, by increasing the number of bytes, packets, and connec-
tion duration, to preserve the malicious functionality. For simplicity,
we set the number of received packets and bytes to 0, assuming that
the external IP does not respond to these connections. We assume
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Category Feature Description
Bytes Total_Sent_Bytes Total number of bytes sent
Min_Sent_Bytes Minimum number of bytes sent per connection
Max_Sent_bytes Maximum of bytes sent per connection
Packets Total_Sent_Pkts Total number of packets sent
Min_Sent_Pkts Minimum number of packets sent per connection
Max_Sent_Pkts Maximum of packets sent per connection
Duration Total_Duration Total duration of all connections
Min_Duration Minimum duration of a connection
Max_Duration Maximum duration of a connection
Connection type Total_TCP Total number of TCP connections
Total_UDP Total number of UDP connections
Table 4: Features definition for malicious connection classification. These features are defined for each port by aggregating
over all connections on that port in a fixed time window.
that the attacker does not have access to the security monitor that
collects the logs and cannot modify directly the log data.
The attack algorithm follows the framework from Algorithm 1.
There is only one family of dependent features, including the pack-
ets and bytes sent, and connection duration. The representative
feature is the number of sent packets, which is updated with the
gradient value, following a binary search for perturbation δ , as spec-
ified in Algorithm UPDATE_FAMILY. The dependent number of
bytes sent and duration features are updated using the update depen-
dency functions (Update_Ratio, Update_Range and Update_OHE),
thus preserving the Ratio, Ranдe and OHE dependencies.
Attack algorithm on engineered features. The goal of the at-
tacker here is to change the prediction of a feature vector aggregated
over time from Benign toMalicious. Therefore, in this attack model,
the attacker has the ability of inserting network connections during
the targeted time window to achieve his goal. Similar to the above
scenario, the attacker controls a victim IP and can send traffic to
external IPs under its control. The adversary has a lot of options in
mounting the attack by selecting the protocol, port, and connection
features. Here we have 17 families of dependent features, one for
the features on each port.
The attack algorithm follows the framework from Algorithm 1.
First, the feature of maximum gradient is determined and the cor-
responding port is identified. The family of dependent features
are all the features computed for that port. The attacker attempts
to add a fixed number of connections on that port (which is a
hyper-parameter of our system). This is done in the INIT_FAMILY
function. The attacker can add either TCP, UDP or both types of con-
nections, according to the gradient sign for these features and also
respecting network-level constraints. The representative feature
for a port’s family is the number of packets that the attacker sends
in a connection. This feature is updated by the gradient value, fol-
lowing a binary search for perturbation δ , as specified in Algorithm
UPDATE_FAMILY .
In the UPDATE_DEP function an update to the aggregated port
features is performed. The difference in the total number of bytes
sent by the attacker and duration is determined from the gradi-
ent, followed by the UPDATE_Ratio function to keep the resulting
values inside the feasible domain. The port family also includes
features such asMin andMax sent bytes and connection duration.
These features are updated by the UPDATE_Stat function. The
detailed algorithm for this attack is illustrated in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 Neris Attack
Require: x : data point in iterationm
1: p: port updated in iterationm
2: x totbytes/x
min
bytes/x
max
bytes: total/min/max number of sent bytes on p
per connection
3: x totdur/x
min
dur /x
max
dur : total/min/max duration on p per connection
4: ∇: gradient of objective with respect to x
5: c: number of connections added
6: minB: the minimum total number of sent bytes from data dis-
trinution
7: maxB: the maximum total number of sent bytes from data
distribution
8: minD: the minimum total connections duration from data dis-
tribution
9: maxD: the maximum total connections duration from data
distribution
10: function INIT_FAMILY(xm ,∇, j)
11: {xi } ← IS_ALLOWED(p, Subset(x j ))
12: if ∇c < 0 and xp ∈ {xi } then
13: xc ← xc + c
14: return c
15: return 0
16: function UPDATE_DEP(s , xm ,∇, Fimax )
17: x totbytes ← Update_Ratio(xm ,∇totbytes, F
bytes
imax
)
18: x totbytes,∆
tot
bytes ← Update_Range(x totbytes,minB,maxB)
19: xminbytes,x
max
bytes ← Update_Stat(xm ,∆totbytes/s, F
bytes
imax
)
20: x totdur ← Update_Ratio(xm ,∇totdur, Fdurimax )
21: x totdur,∆
tot
dur ← Update_Range (x totdur,minD,maxD)
22: xmindur ,x
max
dur ← Update_Stat(xm ,∆totdur/s, Fdurimax )
4.2 Malicious Domain Classifier
The second threat detection application is to classify FQDN domain
names contacted by enterprise hosts asMalicious or Benign.
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Feature Description
NIP Number of IPs contacting the domain
Num_Conn Total number of connections
Avg_Conn Average number of connections by an IP
Frac_empty Fraction of connections with empty content type
Frac_html Fraction of connections with html content type
Frac_img Fraction of connections with image content type
Frac_other Fraction of connections with other content type
Table 5: Connections and Content feature families.
Dataset.We obtained access to a proprietary dataset collected by
a company that includes 89 domain features extracted from HTTP
proxy logs and domain labels. The features come from 7 families,
and we include an example of several families in Table 5. In this
application, we do not have access to the raw HTTP traffic, only to
features extracted from it. Thus, the constraints aremathematical
constraints in the feature space, for instance:
• For the Connection family, we have Stat dependencies: com-
puting min, max, average values over a number of events.
• For the Content family, we need to ensure that the sum of
all ratio values equals to 1. This is a combination of Lin and
NonLin dependencies.
We support other families of dependencies, among which one that
includes combination of Stat and NonLin dependencies. We omit
here the details. The important observation here is that the con-
straints update functions are reusable across applications, and they
can be extended to support new mathematical dependencies.
Attack algorithm. We assume that we add events to the logs,
and never delete or modify existing events. For instance, we can
insert more connections, as in the malicious connection classifier.
The attack algorithm follows the framework from Algorithm 1. If
the feature of maximum gradient has no dependencies, it is just
updated with the gradient value. Otherwise, every dependency
family has specific representative feature and is updated following
one of the specified UPDATE_DEP functions. For example, for the
Connection family, the representative feature is Num_Conn, which
is updated with the gradient value, and other features in this family
are updated by calling the UPDATE_Stat function.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION FOR
NETWORK TRAFFIC CLASSIFIER
We evaluate FENCE for the malicious network traffic classifier
trained with both the raw data and engineered feature represen-
tations. We show feasible attacks that insert a small number of
network connections to change theMalicious prediction. We only
analyze the FENCE attack with the Projected objective here.
5.1 Experimental setup
CTU-13 is a collection of 13 scenarios including both legitimate
traffic from a university campus network, as well as labeled connec-
tions of malicious botnets [14]. We restrict to three scenarios for
the Neris botnet (1, 2, and 9). We choose to train on two of the sce-
narios and test the models on the third, to guarantee independence
between training and testing data.
The raw data representation has 3,712,935 data points, from
which 151,625 are labeled as botnets. The attacker can modify three
features per connection: bytes and packets sent, and duration. The
training data in the engineered features representation has 3869
Malicious examples, and 194,259 Benign examples, and an imbal-
ance ratio of 1:50. There is a set of 432 statistical features that the
attacker can modify (the ones that correspond to the characteristics
of sent traffic on 17 ports). The physical constraints and statistical
dependencies in both scenarios have been detailed in Section 4.1.
We considered two baseline attacks: Baseline 1 (in which the
features that are modified iteratively are selected at random), and
Baseline 2 (in which, additionally, the amount of perturbation is
sampled from a standard normal distribution N (0, 1)).
5.2 Attack results for raw data representation
For training we have used FFDNN with two layers and sigmoid
activation function. The architecture that corresponds to the best
performance has 12 neurons in the first layer, and 1 neuron in
the second layer. We have trained it using Adam optimizer with
learning rate equal to 0.0001 for 20 epochs with batch size 64. The
best results are for training on scenarios 2 and 9, and testing on
scenario 1, with an F1 score of 0.70.
We consider an attack on testing scenario 1, and the success rate
of our attack is 100% already at a small L2 distance of 2. Intuitively,
an attacker can add a few packets and bytes to a connection and
change its classification easily. We compare its performance to
Baseline 2, which achieves only 73% success rate at L2 distance of 2.
5.3 Attack results for engineered features
We perform model selection and training for a number of FFNN
architectures on all combinations of two scenarios, and tested the
models for generality on the third scenario. The best architecture
consists of three layers with 256, 128 and 64 hidden layers. We used
the Adam optimizer, 50 epochs for training, mini-batch of 64, and a
learning rate of 0.00026. The F1 and AUC scores are much better
than the FFNN based on raw data representation. For instance, the
best scenario is training on 1, 9, and testing on 2, which achieve an
F1 score of 0.97, compared to 0.70 for raw data.
We thus perform a more extensive analysis on the attack against
engineered features in this scenario. The testing data for the attack
is 407Malicious examples from scenario 2, among which 397 were
predicted correctly by the classifier.
Evasion attack performance. First, we analyze the attack success
rate with respect to the allowed perturbation, shown in Figure 4a.
The attack reaches 99% success rate at L2 distance 16. Interestingly,
in this case the two baselines perform poorly, demonstrating again
the clear advantages of our framework.We plot next the ROC curves
under evasion attack in Figure 4b (using the 407Malicious examples
and 407 Benign examples from testing scenario 2). At distance
8, the AUC score is 0.93 (compared to 0.98 without adversarial
examples), but there is a sudden change at distance 10, with AUC
score dropping to 0.77. Moreover, at distance 12, the AUC reaches
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(a) FENCE Projected attack
success rate.
(b) ROC curves under FENCE
Projected attack.
(c) Average number of updated
ports.
Figure 4: Projected attack results on malicious connection classifier.
ts id.dest_port proto duration o_bytes r_bytes o_pkts r_pkts state
1 53 UDP 2.26638 67 558 2 2 SF
2 13363 TCP 444.334 707 671 14 11 SF
3 1035 TCP 276.084218 20768 0 110 0 OTH
4 443 TCP 432.47 112404 0 87 0 OTH
Table 6: Example of Zeek logs records (top 3 rows), and log added to create adversarial example (bottom row).
0.12, showing the model’s degradation under evasion attack with
relatively small distance.
The average number of port families updated during the attack
is shown in Figure 4c. The maximum number is 3 ports, but it de-
creases to 1 port at distance higher than 12. While counter-intuitive,
at larger distances the attacker can add larger perturbation to the
aggregated statistics of one port, crossing the decision boundary.
The ports most frequently modified are 443 and 80.
Adversarial examples. We show an adversarial example gener-
ated by the Projected attack at distance 14. The attacker adds only
12 TCP connections on port 443, including 87 packets, each of size
1292 bytes, with connection duration of 432.47 seconds. There are
12 additional Zeek connection logs generated by the attack (see
Table 6). The destination IP can be selected by the attacker so that
it is under its control and does not send any bytes or packets. These
new connections are added to the activity the attacker already does
inside the network, so the malicious functionality of the attack
is preserved. Interestingly, all adversarial attacks succeed with at
most 12 new connections at distances higher than 10.
6 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION FOR
MALICIOUS DOMAIN CLASSIFIER
In this section we perform a detailed evaluation on the malicious
domain classifier on the enterprise dataset.
6.1 Experimental setup
The data for training and testing the models was extracted from
security logs collected by web proxies at the border of a large enter-
prise network with over 100,000 hosts. The number of monitored
external domains in the training set is 227,033, among which 1730
are classified as Malicious and 225,303 are Benign. For training,
we sampled a subset of training data to include 1230 Malicious
domains, and different number of Benign domains to get several
imbalance ratios between the two classes (1, 5, 15, 25, and 50). We
used the remaining 500Malicious domains and sampled 500 Benign
domains for testing the evasion attack. Overall, the dataset includes
89 features from 7 categories.
Among the features included in the dataset, we determined a set
of 31 features that can be modified by an attacker (see Table 7 for
their description). These include communication-related features
(e.g., number of connections, number of bytes sent and received,
etc.), as well as some independent features (e.g., number of levels
in the domain or domain registration age). Other features in the
dataset (for examples, those using URL parameters or values) are
more difficult to change, and we consider them immutable during
the evasion attack.
This dataset is extremely imbalanced, and we sample different
number of Benign domains from the data, to control the imbalance
ratio. We are interested in how the imbalance affects the attack
success rate. On this dataset, we also compare the Projected and
Penalty attack objectives.
6.2 FENCE attack evaluation
We experimented with several models for training classifiers, in-
cluding logistic regression, random forest, and different FFNN archi-
tectures. The best performance was achieved by a two-layer FFNN
with 80 neurons in the first layer, and 50 neurons in the second
layer. ReLU activation function is used after all hidden layers except
for the last layer, which uses sigmoid. We used the Adam optimizer
and SGD with different learning rates. The best results were ob-
tained with Adam and learning rate of 0.0003. We ran training for
75 epochs with mini-batch size of 32. As a result, we obtained the
model with AUC score 89% in cross-validation accuracy, for the
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Family Feature ID Feature Description
Connections 1 Num_Conn Number of established connections
2 Avg_Conn Average number of connections per host
Bytes 3 Total_Recv_Bytes Total number of received bytes
4 Total_Sent_Bytes Total number of sent bytes
5 Avg_Ratio_Bytes Average ratio of received bytes
over sent bytes per IP
6 Min_Ratio_Bytes Maximum ratio of received bytes
over sent bytes per IP
7 Max_Ratio_Bytes Minimum ratio of received bytes
over sent bytes per IP
HTTP 8 Num_POST Total number of POST requests
Method 9 Num_GET Total number of GET requests
10 Avg_POST Average number of POST requests
over GET requests per IP
11 Min_POST Minimum number of POST requests
over GET requests per IP
12 Max_POST Maximum number of POST requests
over GET requests per IP
Result 59 Num_200 Number of connections with result code 200
Code 60 Num_300 Number of connections with result code 300
61 Num_400 Number of connections with result code 400
62 Num_500 Number of connections with result code 500
63 Frac_200 Fraction of connections with result code 200
64 Frac_300 Fraction of connections with result code 300
65 Frac_400 Fraction of connections with result code 400
66 Frac_500 Fraction of connections with result code 500
Independent 43 Avg_OS Average number operating systems
extracted from user-agent
44 Avg_Browser Average number of browsers used
68 Dom_Levels Number of levels
69 Sub_Domains Number of sub-domains
70 Dom_Length Length of domain
71 Reg_Age WHOIS registration age
72 Reg_Validity WHOIS registration validity
73 Update_Age WHOIS update age
74 Update_Validity WHOIS update validity
75 Num_ASNs Number of ASNs
76 Num_Countries Number of countries contacted the domain
Table 7: Feature set for malicious domain classification that can be modified by the evasion attack.
balanced case. These results were comparable to the best random
forest model we trained and better than logistic regression.
The ROC curves for training logistic regression, random forest
are given in Figure 5 (a), while the results for FFNN with different
imbalanced ratios are in Figure 5 (b). Interestingly, the performance
of the model increases to 93% AUC for imbalance ratio up to 25,
after which it starts to decrease (with AUC of 83% at a ratio of 50).
Our intuition is that the FFNN model achieves better performance
when more training data is available (up to a ratio of 25). But once
the Benign class dominates theMalicious one (at ratio of 50), the
model performance starts to degrade.
Existing Attack.We run the existing C&W attack [8] in order to
measure the feasibility of adversarial examples. While the attack
reaches 98% success at distance 20 (for the balanced case), the
resulting adversarial examples are outside the feasibility region. An
example is included in Table 8, showing that the average number of
connections is not equal to the total number of connections divided
by the number of IPs. Additionally, the average ratio of received
bytes over sent bytes is not equal to maximum and minimum values
of ratio (as it should be when the number of IPs is 1).
FENCE Projected attack results. We evaluate the success rate
of the attack with Projected objective first for balanced classes
(1:1 ratio). We compare in Figure 6a the attack against the two
baselines. The attacks are run on 412Malicious testing examples
classified correctly by the FFNN. The Projected attack improves
both baselines, with Baseline 2 performing much worse, reaching
success rate 57% at distance 20, and Baseline 1 having success 91.7%
compared to our attack (98.3% success). This shows that the attacks
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(a) Models performance. (b) Imbalance results on FFNN.
Figure 5: Training results for malicious domain classifier.
(a) FENCE attack success rate. (b) ROC curves under attack. (c) Imbalance sensitivity.
Figure 6: FENCE Projected attack results for the malicious domain classifier.
Feature Input Adversarial Example Correct Value
NIP 1 1 1
N_Conn 15 233.56 233.56
Avg_Conns 15 59.94 233.56
Avg_Ratio_Bytes 8.27 204.01 204.01
Max_Ratio_Bytes 8.27 240.02 204.01
Min_Ratio_Bytes 8.27 119.12 204.01
Table 8: Infeasible C&W adversarial example, with inconsis-
tent feature values in red (correct values in green).
is still performing reasonably if feature selection is done randomly,
but it is very important to add perturbation to features consistent
with the optimization objective.
We also measure in Figure 6b the decrease of the modelâĂŹs
performance before and after the evasion attack at different per-
turbations (using 500Malicious and 500 Benign examples not used
in training). While AUC score is 0.87 originally, it drastically de-
creases to 0.52 under evasion attack at perturbation 7. This shows
the significant degradation of the modelâĂŹs performance under
evasion attack.
Finally, we run the attack at different imbalance ratios and mea-
sured its success for different perturbations. In this experiment,
we select 62 test examples which all models (trained for different
imbalance ratios) classified correctly before the evasion attack. The
results are illustrated in Figure 6c. At L2 distance 20, the evasion at-
tack achieves 100% success rate for all ratios except 1. Additionally,
we observe that with higher imbalance, it is easier for the attacker
to find adversarial examples (at fixed distance). One reason is that
models that have lower performance (as the one trained with 1:50
imbalance ratio) are easier to attack. Second, we believe that as the
imbalance gets higher the model becomes more biased towards the
majority class (Benign), which is the target class of the attacker,
making it easier to cross the decision boundary between classes.
We include an adversarial example in Table 9. We only show the
features that are modified by the attack and their original value.
As we observe, the attack preserves the feature dependencies: the
average ratio of received bytes over sent bytes (Avg_Ratio_Bytes)
is consistent with number of received (Total_Recv_Bytes) and sent
(Total_Sent_Bytes) bytes. In addition, the attack modifies the do-
main registration age, an independent feature, relevant in malicious
domain classification [25]. However there is a higher cost to change
this feature: the attacker should register a malicious domain and
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(a) FENCE attack success rate. (b) ROC curves under attack. (c) Imbalance sensitivity.
Figure 7: FENCE Penalty attack results for malicious domain classifier.
wait to get a larger registration age. If this cost is prohibitive, we
can easily modify our framework to make this feature immutable.
Feature Original Adversarial
NIP 1 1
Total_Recv_Bytes 32.32 43653.50
Total_Sent_Bytes 2.0 2702.62
Avg_Ratio_Bytes 16.15 16.15
Registration_Age 349 3616
Table 9: Adversarial example for the FENCEProjected attack
at distance 10.
FENCEPenalty attack results.Wenowdiscuss the results achieved
by applying our attack with the Penalty objective on the testing
examples. Similar to the Projected attack, we compare the suc-
cess rate of the Penalty attack to the two types of baseline attacks
for balanced classes, in Figure 7a (using the 412Malicious testing
examples classified correctly). Overall, the Penalty objective is per-
forming worse than the Projected one, reaching 79% success rate
at L2 distance of 20. We observe that in this case both baselines
perform worse, and the attack improves upon both baselines sig-
nificantly. The decrease of the modelâĂŹs performance under the
Penalty attack is illustrated in Figure 7b (for 500 Malicious and
500 Benign testing examples). While AUC is 0.87 originally on the
testing dataset, it decreases to 0.59 under the evasion attacks at
maximum allowed perturbation of 7. Furthermore, we measure the
attack success rate at different imbalance ratios in Figure 7c (using
the 62 testing examples classified correctly by all models). For each
ratio value we searched for the best hyper-parameter c between 0
and 1 with step 0.05. Here, as with the Projected attack, we see the
same trend: as the imbalance ratio gets higher, the attack performs
better, and it works best at imbalance ratio of 50.
Attack comparison.We compare the success rate of our Projected
and Penalty FENCE attacks with the C&W attack, as well as an
attack we call Post-processing. The Post-processing attack runs
directly the original C&W developed for continuous domains, after
which it projects the adversarial example to the raw input space
to enforce the constraints. For each family of dependent features,
the attack retains the value of the representative feature, but then
modifies the dependent features using the UPDATE_DEP function.
The success rate of all these attacks is shown in Figure 8, using
the 412Malicious testing examples classified correctly. The attacks
based on our FENCE framework (with Projected and Penalty ob-
jectives) perform best, as they account for feature dependencies
during the adversarial example generation. The attack with the
Projected objective has the highest performance. The vanilla C&W
has slightly worse performance at small perturbation values, even
though it does not take into consideration the feature constraints
and works in an enlarged feature space. Interestingly, the Post-
processing attack performs worse (reaching only 0.005% success at
distance 20 – can generate 2 out of 412 adversarial examples). This
demonstrates that it is not sufficient to run state-of-art attacks for
continuous domains and then adjust the feature dependencies, but
more sophisticated attack strategies are needed.
Figure 8: Malicious domain classifier attacks. FENCE Pro-
jected attacks perform best. C&Wdoes not generate feasible
adversarial examples.
Number of features modified. We compare the number of fea-
tures modified during the attack iterative algorithm to construct
the adversarial examples for three attacks: Projected, Penalty, and
C&W.
It is not surprising that the C&W attack modifies almost all
features, as it works in L2 norms without any restriction in feature
space. Both the Projected and the Penalty attacks modify a much
smaller number of features (4 on average).
We are interested in determining if there is a relationship be-
tween feature importance and choice of feature by the optimization
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(a) Histogram on feature
modifications.
(b) Number of updates (left),
feature importance (right).
Figure 9: Feature modification statistics for malicious domain classifier.
algorithm. For additional details on feature description, we include
the list of features that can be modified in Table 7.
We observe that features of higher importance are chosen more
frequently by the optimization attack. However, since we are mod-
ifying the representative feature in each family, the number of
modifications on the representative feature is usually higher (it ac-
cumulates all the importance of the features in that family). For the
Bytes family, feature 3 (number of received bytes) is the represen-
tative feature and it is updated more than 350 times. However, for
features that have no dependencies (e.g., 68 – number of levels in
the domain, 69 – number of sub-domains, 71 – domain registration
age, and 72 – domain registration validity), the number of updates
corresponds to the feature importance.
Weaker attack models.We consider a threat model in which the
adversary only knows the feature representation, but not the exact
ML model or the training data. One approach to generate adver-
sarial examples is through transferability [12, 24, 30, 37, 40]. We
perform several experiments to test the transferability of the Pro-
jected attacks against FFNN to logistic regression (LR) and random
forest (RF). Models were trained with different data and we vary
the imbalance ratio. The results are in Table 10. We observe that
the largest transferability rate to both LR and RF is for the highest
imbalanced ratio of 50 (98.2% adversarial examples transfer to LR
and 94.8% to RF). As we increase the imbalance ratio, the transfer
rate increases, and the transferability rate to LR is lower than to RF.
Ratio FFNN LR RF
1 100% 40% 51.7%
5 93.3% 66.5% 82.9%
15 99% 60.9% 90.2%
25 100% 47.6% 68.8%
50 100% 98.2% 94.8%
Table 10: Transferability of adversarial examples from
FFNN to LR and RF. We vary the imbalance ratio in train-
ing. Column FFNN shows the white-box attack success rate.
We also look at the transferability between different FFNN ar-
chitectures trained on different datasets (results in Table 11). The
attacks transfer best at highest imbalance ratio (with success rate
higher than 96%), confirming that weaker models are easier to
attack.
Ratio DNN1 DNN2 DNN3
[80, 50] [160, 80] [100, 50, 25]
1 100% 57.6% 42.3%
5 93.3% 73.6% 58.6%
15 99% 78.6% 52.4%
25 100% 51.4% 45.3%
50 100% 96% 97.1%
Table 11: Transferability between architectures (number of
neurons per layer in the second row). Adversarial examples
computed for DNN1 are transferred to DNN2 and DNN3.
6.3 Adversarial Training
Finally, we looked at defensive approaches to increase the FFNN
robustness in this setting. A well-known defensive technique is
adversarial training [15, 26]. We trained FFNN using adversarial
training with the Projected attack at L2 distance 20. We trained
the model adversarially for 11 epochs and obtain AUC score of
89% (each epoch takes approximately 7 hours). We measure the
Projected attack’s success rate for the balanced case against the
standard and adversarially training models in Figure 10. Interest-
ingly, the success rate of the evasion attacks significantly drops for
the adversarially-trained model and reaches only 16.5% at 20 L2
distance. This demonstrates that adversarial training is a promising
direction for designing robust ML models for security. We plan to
investigate it further and optimize its design in future work.
7 RELATEDWORK
Adversarial machine learning studies ML vulnerabilities against
attacks [19]. Research on the robustness of DNNs at testing time
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Figure 10: Success rate of the FENCE Projected attack against adversarially and standard trained model.
started with the work of Biggio et al. [5] and Szegedy et al. [38].
They showed that classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial examples
generated with minimal perturbation to testing inputs. Since then,
the area of adversarial ML has received a lot of attention, with
the majority of work focused on evasion attacks (at testing time),
e.g., [3, 8, 15, 23, 31, 32]. Other classes of attacks include poisoning
(e.g., [6, 41]) and privacy attacks (e.g., [13, 34]), but we focus here
on evasion attacks.
Evasion attacks in security. Several evasion attacks have been
proposed against models with discrete and constrained input vec-
tors, as encountered in security. The majority of these use datasets
with binary features, not considering dependencies in feature space.
Biggio et al. [5] use a gradient-based attack to construct adver-
sarial examples for malicious PDF detection by only adding new
keywords to PDFs. Grosse et al. [17] leverage the JSMA attack by
Papernot et al. [32] for a malware classification application in which
features can be added or removed. Suciu et al. [36] add bytes to
malicious binaries either at the end or in slack regions to create
adversarial examples. Kreuk [21] discover regions in executables
that would not affect the intended malware behavior. Kolosnjaji
et al. [20] create gradient-based attack against malware detection
DNNs that learn from raw bytes, and can create adversarial ex-
amples by only changing few specific bytes at the end of each
malware sample. Xu et al. [42] propose a black-box attack based on
genetic algorithms for manipulating PDF files, while maintaining
the required format. Dang et al. [10] propose a black-box attack
against PDF malware classifiers that uses hill-climbing over a set
of feasible transformations. Anderson et al. [1] construct general
black-box framework based on reinforcement learning for attack-
ing static portable executable anti-malware engines. Kulynych et
al. [22] propose a graphical framework for discrete domains with
guarantees of minimal adversarial cost. Recently, Pierazzi et al. [33]
define a formalization for the domain-space attacks, along with a
new white-box attack against Android malware classification. The
authors use automated software transplantation to extract slices of
bytecode from benign applications and inject them into a malicious
host to mimic the benign activity and evade the classifier. Evasion
attacks for network traffic classifiers include: Apruzesse et al. [2]
analyzing the robustness of random forest for botnet classification;
Clements et al. [9] evaluating the robustness of an anomaly detec-
tion method [27] against existing attacks; and De Lucia et al. [11]
attacking an SVM for network scanning detection. However, none
of the previous work can handle the complex dependencies sup-
ported by our FENCE framework.
8 CONCLUSIONS
We showed that evasion attacks against DNNs can be designed to
preserve the dependencies in feature space in constrained domains.
We proposed a general framework FENCE for generating adversar-
ial examples that respects mathematical dependencies and domain-
specific constraints imposed by these applications.We demonstrated
evasion attacks that insert a small number of network connections
(12 records in Zeek connection logs) to mis-classifyMalicious activ-
ity as Benign in a malicious connection classifier. We also showed
that adversarial training has the potential to increase the robustness
of classifiers in the malicious domain setting.
Our FENCE framework is not restricted to security applications,
and we plan to apply it to healthcare and financial scenarios. An im-
portant open problem in this space is how to increase the resilience
of DNN classifiers used in critical, constrained applications.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Simona Boboila and Talha Ongun for generating the fea-
tures used for the malicious network traffic classifier. This project
was funded by NSF under grant CNS-1717634 and by a Google
Security and Privacy Award. This research was also sponsored
by the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command
Army Research Laboratory under Cooperative Agreement Number
W911NF-13-2-0045 (ARL Cyber Security CRA), and by the contract
number W911NF-18-C0019 with the U.S. Army Contracting Com-
mand - Aberdeen Proving Ground (ACC-APG) and the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The views and con-
clusions contained in this document are those of the authors and
should not be interpreted as representing the official policies, ei-
ther expressed or implied, of the Combat Capabilities Development
Command Army Research Laboratory, ACC-APG, DARPA, or the
U.S. Government. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce
and distribute reprints for Government purposes notwithstanding
any copyright notation here on.
REFERENCES
[1] Hyrum S Anderson, Anant Kharkar, Bobby Filar, David Evans, and Phil Roth. 2018.
Learning to evade static PE machine learning malware models via reinforcement
learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.08917 (2018).
14
[2] Giovanni Apruzzese and Michele Colajanni. 2018. Evading Botnet Detectors
Based on Flows and Random Forest with Adversarial Samples. 1–8. https:
//doi.org/10.1109/NCA.2018.8548327
[3] Anish Athalye, Nicholas Carlini, and David Wagner. 2018. Obfuscated gradients
give a false sense of security: Circumventing defenses to adversarial examples.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.00420 (2018).
[4] Karel Bartos, Michal Sofka, and Vojtech Franc. 2016. Optimized Invariant Rep-
resentation of Network Traffic for Detecting Unseen Malware Variants. In 25th
USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 16). USENIX Association, 807–822.
[5] Battista Biggio, Igino Corona, Davide Maiorca, Blaine Nelson, Nedim Srndic,
Pavel Laskov, Giorgio Giacinto, and Fabio Roli. 2013. Evasion Attacks against
Machine Learning at Test Time. In Proc. Joint European Conference on Machine
Learning and Knowledge Discovery in Databases (ECML PKDD).
[6] Battista Biggio, Blaine Nelson, and Pavel Laskov. 2012. Poisoning attacks against
support vector machines. In ICML.
[7] Leyla Bilge, Engin Kirda, Kruegel Christopher, and Marco Balduzzi. 2011. EX-
POSURE: Finding Malicious Domains Using Passive DNS Analysis. In Proc. 18th
Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS).
[8] Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. 2017. Towards Evaluating the Robustness of
Neural Networks. In Proc. IEEE Security and Privacy Symposium.
[9] Joseph Clements, Yuzhe Yang, Ankur Sharma, Hongxin Hu, and Yingjie Lao. 2019.
Rallying Adversarial Techniques against Deep Learning for Network Security.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1903.11688 (2019).
[10] Hung Dang, Yue Huang, and Ee-Chien Chang. 2017. Evading classifiers by
morphing in the dark. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 119–133.
[11] Michael J De Lucia and Chase Cotton. 2019. Adversarial Machine Learning for
Cyber Security. Journal Of Information Systems Applied Research (2019).
[12] Ambra Demontis, Marco Melis, Maura Pintor, Matthew Jagielski, Battista Biggio,
Alina Oprea, Cristina Nita-Rotaru, and Fabio Roli. 2019. Why do adversarial
attacks transfer? Explaining transferability of evasion and poisoning attacks. In
28th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 19). 321–338.
[13] M. Fredrikson, S. Jha, and T. Ristenpart. 2015. Model Inversion Attacks that
Exploit Confidence Information and Basic Countermeasures. In Proceedings of
the 22nd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS).
[14] Sebastian Garcia, Martin Grill, Jan Stiborek, and Alejandro Zunino. 2014. An
empirical comparison of botnet detection methods. Computers and Security 45
(2014), 100–123.
[15] Ian J. Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. 2014. Explaining and
Harnessing Adversarial Examples. arXiv:1412.6572.
[16] Kathrin Grosse, Praveen Manoharan, Nicolas Papernot, Michael Backes, and
Patrick McDaniel. 2017. On the (Statistical) Detection of Adversarial Examples.
arXiv:1702.06280.
[17] Kathrin Grosse, Nicolas Papernot, Praveen Manoharan, Michael Backes, and
Patrick McDaniel. 2016. Adversarial perturbations against deep neural networks
for malware classification. arXiv preprint arXiv:1606.04435 (2016).
[18] Xin Hu, Jiyong Jang, Marc Ph. Stoecklin, Ting Wang, Douglas Lee Schales,
Dhilung Kirat, and Josyula R. Rao. 2016. BAYWATCH: Robust Beaconing Detec-
tion to Identify Infected Hosts in Large-Scale Enterprise Networks. In DSN. IEEE
Computer Society, 479–490.
[19] Ling Huang, Anthony D Joseph, Blaine Nelson, Benjamin IP Rubinstein, and
JD Tygar. 2011. Adversarial machine learning. In Proceedings of the 4th ACM
workshop on Security and artificial intelligence. ACM, 43–58.
[20] Bojan Kolosnjaji, Ambra Demontis, Battista Biggio, Davide Maiorca, Giorgio
Giacinto, Claudia Eckert, and Fabio Roli. 2018. Adversarial malware binaries:
Evading deep learning formalware detection in executables. In 2018 26th European
Signal Processing Conference (EUSIPCO). IEEE, 533–537.
[21] Felix Kreuk, Assi Barak, Shir Aviv-Reuven, Moran Baruch, Benny Pinkas, and
Joseph Keshet. 2018. Deceiving end-to-end deep learning malware detectors
using adversarial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.04528 (2018).
[22] Bogdan Kulynych, Jamie Hayes, Nikita Samarin, and Carmela Troncoso. 2018.
Evading classifiers in discrete domains with provable optimality guarantees.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.10939 (2018).
[23] Alexey Kurakin, Ian Goodfellow, and Samy Bengio. 2016. Adversarial examples
in the physical world. arXiv preprint arXiv:1607.02533 (2016).
[24] Yanpei Liu, Xinyun Chen, Chang Liu, and Dawn Song. 2016. Delving into transfer-
able adversarial examples and black-box attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1611.02770
(2016).
[25] Justin Ma, Lawrence K. Saul, Stefan Savage, and Geoffrey M. Voelker. 2009.
Beyond Blacklists: Learning to Detect Malicious Web Sites from Suspicious URLs.
In Proc. 15th ACM International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data
Mining (KDD).
[26] Aleksander Madry, Aleksandar Makelov, Ludwig Schmidt, Dimitris Tsipras, and
Adrian Vladu. 2017. Towards deep learningmodels resistant to adversarial attacks.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.06083 (2017).
[27] Yisroel Mirsky, Tomer Doitshman, Yuval Elovici, and Asaf Shabtai. 2018. Kitsune:
an ensemble of autoencoders for online network intrusion detection. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1802.09089 (2018).
[28] Talha Ongun, Timothy Sakharaov, Simona Boboila, Alina Oprea, and Tina Eliassi-
Rad. 2019. On Designing Machine Learning Models for Malicious Network Traffic
Classification. arXiv preprint arXiv:1907.04846 (2019).
[29] Alina Oprea, Zhou Li, Robin Norris, and Kevin Bowers. 2018. MADE: Security
Analytics for Enterprise Threat Detection. In Proceedings of the 34th Annual
Computer Security Applications Conference. ACM, 124–136.
[30] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, and Ian Goodfellow. 2016. Transferability
in machine learning: from phenomena to black-box attacks using adversarial
samples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1605.07277 (2016).
[31] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Ian Goodfellow, Somesh Jha, Z Berkay Celik,
and Ananthram Swami. 2017. Practical Black-Box Attacks against Machine
Learning. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGSAC Asia Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (AsiaCCS).
[32] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Somesh Jha, Matt Fredrikson, Z. Berkay
Celik, and Ananthram Swami. 2017. The Limitations of Deep Learning in Ad-
versarial Settings. In Proc. IEEE European Security and Privacy Symposium (Euro
S&P).
[33] Fabio Pierazzi, Feargus Pendlebury, Jacopo Cortellazzi, and Lorenzo Cavallaro.
2019. Intriguing Properties of Adversarial ML Attacks in the Problem Space.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1911.02142 (2019).
[34] Reza Shokri, Marco Stronati, Congzheng Song, and Vitaly Shmatikov. 2017. Mem-
bership Inference Attacks againstMachine LearningModels. In Proc. IEEE Security
and Privacy Symposium (S&P).
[35] N. Srndic and P. Laskov. 2014. Practical Evasion of a Learning-Based Classifier:
A Case Study. In Proc. IEEE Security and Privacy Symposium.
[36] Octavian Suciu, Scott E Coull, and Jeffrey Johns. 2018. Exploring adversarial
examples in malware detection. arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.08280 (2018).
[37] Octavian Suciu, Radu Marginean, Yigitcan Kaya, Hal Daume III, and Tudor
Dumitras. 2018. When does machine learning {FAIL}? generalized transferability
for evasion and poisoning attacks. In 27th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX
Security 18). 1299–1316.
[38] Christian Szegedy,Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan,
Ian Goodfellow, and Rob Fergus. 2014. Intriguing properties of neural networks.
arXiv:1312.6199.
[39] Liang Tong, Bo Li, Chen Hajaj, Chaowei Xiao, Ning Zhang, and Yevgeniy
Vorobeychik. 2019. Improving Robustness of ML Classifiers against Realiz-
able Evasion Attacks Using Conserved Features. In 28th USENIX Security Sym-
posium (USENIX Security 19). USENIX Association, Santa Clara, CA, 285–302.
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/tong
[40] Florian Tramèr, Nicolas Papernot, Ian Goodfellow, Dan Boneh, and Patrick Mc-
Daniel. 2017. The space of transferable adversarial examples. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1704.03453 (2017).
[41] Huang Xiao, Battista Biggio, Gavin Brown, Giorgio Fumera, Claudia Eckert, and
Fabio Roli. 2015. Is feature selection secure against training data poisoning?. In
Proc. 32nd International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML, Vol. 37). 1689–
1698.
[42] Weilin Xu, Yanjun Qi, and David Evans. 2016. Automatically evading classifiers.
In Proceedings of the 2016 Network and Distributed Systems Symposium. 21–24.
15
